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Faith in the power and righteousness of retribution has taken over the American criminal justice system. Approaching punishment and responsibility from a philosophical perspective, Erin Kelly challenges the moralism behind harsh treatment of criminal offenders and calls into question our society's commitment to mass incarceration. The Limits of Blame takes issue with a criminal justice system that aligns legal criteria of guilt with moral criteria of blameworthiness. Many incarcerated people do not meet the criteria of blameworthiness, even when they are guilty of crimes. Kelly underscores the problems of exaggerating what criminal guilt indicates, particularly when it is tied to the illusion that we know how long and in what ways criminals should suffer. Our practice of assigning blame has gone beyond a pragmatic need for protection and a moral need to repudiate harmful acts publicly.
"This is an American story, unsettled by contradictions, constituted by unresolvable loss and open-ended hope, produced through brutal exclusivities and persistent insurgencies. This is the story of Lincoln prison." In her Introduction, Sabina E. Vaught passionately details why the subject of prisons and prison schooling is so important. An unprecedented institutional ethnography of race and gender power in one state's juvenile prison school system, Compulsory will have major implications for public education everywhere. Vaught argues that through its educational apparatus, the state disproportionately removes young Black men from their homes and subjects them to the abuses of captivity. She explores the various legal and ideological forces shaping juvenile prison and prison schooling, and examines how these forces are mechanized across multiple state apparatuses, not least school.
Written by a noted expert in criminal law, this book explores the philosophical underpinnings of the law's major doctrines concerning actus reus, mens rea, and defences, showing that they are not always driven by culpability. They are grounded also in principles of moral responsibility,ascriptive responsibility, and wrongdoing. As such, they engage wider debates about wrongdoing, and about the boundaries between liability and freedom.This multi-textured analysis allows this book to take more nuanced positions about many important controversies in criminal law. It argues, for example, that liability for omissions and for negligence - and even some strict liability elements - can sometimes be legitimate yet, at the same time,should be relatively rare. It also explains why principles of causation can differ in the criminal law from other contexts; what is wrong with the "voluntary act" requirement; and why luck can affect the wrongs we commit without changing our degree of blameworthiness for committing them.
Conceptualized outside the theoretical framing of both liberal as well as critical approaches, this book re-imagines the law by exploring the contradictions and polarities of in terms of its relationship with violence. It encompasses and interweaves themes and ideas as diverse as deathpenalty, community might, state sovereignty on the one hand, to animal rights, sexual consent, children's agency and LGBT rights, on the other. While acknowledging that law is fundamentally and inherently tied to violence, the objective of this eclectic collection is to respond to and engage withthe violence of law by exploring alternate ways of conceptualizing, reading, practising, and making the law.
How should we act? How should the world be organised? This book offers answers to these questions by analysing Kant's conception of normativity. It presents different applications of Kant's theory of normativity to meta-ethical, moral, juridical and political issues of contemporary relevance.
Rights and Civilizations, translated from the Italian original, traces a history of international law to illustrate the origins of the Western colonial project and its attempts to civilize the non-European world. The book, ranging from the sixteenth century to the twenty-first, explains how the West sought to justify its own colonial conquests through an ideology that revolved around the idea of its own assumed superiority, variously attributed to Christian peoples (in the early modern age), Western 'civil' peoples (in the nineteenth century), and 'developed' peoples (at the beginning of the twentieth century), and now to democratic Western peoples. In outlining this history and discourse, the book shows that, while the Western conception may style itself as universal, it is in fact relative. This comes out by bringing the Western civilization into comparison with others, mainly the Islamic one, suggesting the need for an 'intercivilizational' approach to international law.